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BEYOND SEX-PLUS: ACKNOLWEDGING BLACK WOMEN IN
EMPLOYMENT LAW AND POLICY
BY JAMILLAH BOWMAN WILLIAMS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Even as Kamala Harris makes history by becoming the country’s first Black woman Vice
President, systemic racism and sexism remain pervasive in the United States, stifling life outcomes
for Black women.1 In an intensely divided political climate, Black women workers bear the brunt
of the emboldened racism and sexism of Trump’s America, while at the same time, they also
remain at the margins of broader social movements committed to racial and gender justice. The
expansion of the #MeToo movement in 2017 and the killing of George Floyd in 2020 led to broad
activism, both online and on the ground, spurring mass protests, strikes, boycotts, and calls for
legal reform.2 Workers, students, investors, community leaders, and politicians began demanding
greater gender and racial equity.3 At the other extreme, former president Trump not only expressed
hostility towards women and repeatedly failed to condemn white supremacists, but he also used
his executive power to ban all anti-bias training that mentioned the concept of intersectionality.4
While the Biden-Harris administration and Democratic control of Congress offer more promise
for Black women, it remains unclear whether this new leadership will produce policy reform and
deeper structural change that will substantively improve employment outcomes for Black women.
This Article focuses on the challenges Black women continue to face when bringing
intersectional claims, despite experiencing high rates of discrimination and harassment. It has been
more than 30 years since Kimberlé Crenshaw published her pathbreaking article critiquing the
inadequacy of antidiscrimination law in addressing claims at the intersection of race and sex
*
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1
See e.g. Jocelyn Fyre, Racism and Sexism Combine to Shortchange Working Black Women, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS
(Aug.
22,
2019,
12:01
AM),
<https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/women/news/2019/08/22/473775/racism-sexism-combine-shortchangeworking-black-women>.
2
See Jamillah Bowman Williams et al., #MeToo as Catalyst: A Glimpse into 21st Century Activism, 2019 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 371 (2019); Jamillah Bowman Williams et al., #BlackLivesMatter—Getting from Contemporary Social
Movements to Structural Change, 12 CAL. L. REV. ONLINE 1 (Jun. 2021).
3
See Maria Torres-Soringer, The Fight for Equality at the Center of the George Floyd Case, FORD FOUND. (June
9, 2020),
<https://www.fordfoundation.org/just-matters/equals-change-blog/posts/the-fight-for-equality-at-thecenter-of-the-george-floyd-case>.
4
President Biden reversed this ban on his first day in office. See Jessica Guynn, President Joe Biden Rescinds
Donald Trump Ban on Diversity Training About Systemic Racism, USA TODAY (Jan. 26, 2021, 4:10 PM),
<https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2021/01/20/biden-executive-order-overturns-trump-diversity-trainingban/4236891001>.

discrimination.5 The new status quo has not resolved the problems that she documented, and has
introduced a set of second generation intersectionality issues. Most significantly, many courts now
recognize that Black women experience discrimination differently than do white women or Black
men. Yet, despite the professionally and psychologically disabling consequences of such
discrimination, judges have failed to develop a new analytic paradigm for addressing intersectional
claims under Title VII. Likewise, Congress has failed to offer a legislative solution, and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission provides scant guidance for employees, employers, and
attorneys attempting to navigate these claims. Even the recent flurry of #MeToo-inspired state
legislative reforms miss the opportunity to address this persistent problem.
This isn’t to say that no workable approaches exist. They do, they just require a close
examination of the current approaches, and then taking a step back to re-imagine how we currently
conceptualize antidiscrimination law. This Article is the first to identify and critique the four
primary approaches used by courts of appeals to analyze intersectional claims, and the first to
assess the potential impact of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bostock v. Clayton on intersectional
race and sex claims under Title VII. In subsequent articles, I will build on these findings to propose
a better framework for courts to follow when analyzing intersectional discrimination and
harassment cases.
Part II describes how intersectional discrimination and harassment shape the workplace
experiences of Black women. Part III examines how discrimination and harassment are analyzed
under Title VII and how existing legal frameworks are problematic for Black women plaintiffs.
Part IV provides an overview of the current state of the law, focusing on how courts diverge in
their approach to intersectional claims, resulting in confusion for employees, employers, and
attorneys, and injustice for some plaintiffs. Part V analyzes more recent trends in courts and state
legislatures, including the impact of Bostock v. Clayton County, the concept of discriminatory
harassment in state law, and the reasonable Black woman standard. Part VI concludes with a
discussion of future directions for antidiscrimination law, including how reform efforts can better
address the existing gaps in the law to make Title VII and related state policies more effective at
protecting Black women workers.
Despite vocal resistance to Critical Race Theory, the ongoing movement for racial justice and
increased receptiveness to address systemic racism following the mass protests in 2020, make this
an opportune time to renew our discussion of intersectionality and reshape the meager analytical
framework of antidiscrimination law. This Article lays the foundation for future research and
second generation law and policy proposals that will take crucial steps towards finally
acknowledging and addressing the real discrimination Black women face.
II. THE INTERSECTIONAL EXPERIENCES OF BLACK WOMEN AT WORK
Black women are disproportionately impacted by a multitude of employment challenges.6 This
5
Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989).
6
Mark Paul et al., Returns in the Labor Market: A Nuanced View of Penalties at the Intersection of Race and
Gender 3-4 (Wash. Ctr. for Equitable Growth, Working Paper, 2018), <https://equitablegrowth.org/workingpapers/intersectionality-labor-market> (scroll down and click “download file”) (discussing why intersectionality
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includes a substandard minimum wage,7 an ongoing pay gap despite increasing levels of education,
and inadequate health and safety measures for frontline workers during COVID-19.8 Thus, Black
women are subject to deeply entrenched forces of systemic racism and sexism at the structural
level and at the interpersonal level. They also face unique stereotypes and biases that neither white
women nor Black men face. This leads Black women to encounter high rates of discrimination and
harassment in the workplace that can take many forms.9 Yet, employment law and policy continues
to fail Black women workers who seek to bring discrimination and harassment claims under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.10
Over thirty years ago, Kimberlé Crenshaw coined the term intersectionality and created a
theoretical framework to critique antidiscrimination laws and policies for failing to properly
acknowledge compounded forms of discrimination based on the intersection of two or more
protected categories, such as race and sex.11 Current antidiscrimination law is especially
problematic for Black women, many of whom report not centrally identifying with race or sex, but
with a racialized gender identity inextricably intertwining the two.12 Consider the case of Emeraldtheory should be included in analyses of labor market discrimination and deepening the understanding of how the
possession of one socially salient identity such as being a woman or being black may oversimplify the effects of the
complex of social identities that interact in ways which researchers still need to identify.)
7
See Nicole Bateman & Martha Ross, Why Has COVID-19 Been Especially Harmful for Working Women?,
BROOKINGS INST. (Oct. 2020), <https://www.brookings.edu/essay/why-has-covid-19-been-especially-harmful-forworking-women> (“[B]efore COVID-19, nearly half of all working women – 46% or 28 million – worked in jobs
paying low wages, with median earnings of only $10.93 per hour. The share of workers earning low wages is higher
among Black women (54%) and Hispanic or Latina women (64%) than among white women (40%), reflecting the
structural racism that has limited options in education, housing, and employment for people of color.”); Allana Akhtar,
Lower Pay, More Harassment: How Work in America Failed Women of Color in the 2010s, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 18,
2019, 7:57 AM), <https://www.businessinsider.com/how-work-is-failing-women-of-color-2019-10#black-andhispanic-women-are-far-more-likely-to-work-low-paying-jobs-3> (“Black women . . . are more likely to work in food
service, domestic work, and home healthcare – all some of the worst paying occupations in the country.”).
8
See Black Woman Aren’t Paid Fairly, and that Hits Harder in an Economic Crisis, LEAN IN,
<https://leanin.org/data-about-the-gender-pay-gap-for-black-women> (last visited May 14, 2021); Andre M. Perry,
To Protect Black Women and Save America from Itself, Elect Black Women, BROOKINGS INST. (July 2020),
<https://www.brookings.edu/essay/to-protect-black-women-and-save-america-from-itself-elect-black-women>
(finding that “Black women have lower earnings than Black men, as well as white men and women”); Adia Harvey
Wingfield, Women Are Advancing in the Workplace, but Women of Color Still Lag Behind, BROOKINGS INST. (Oct.
2020),
<https://www.brookings.edu/essay/women-are-advancing-in-the-workplace-but-women-of-color-still-lagbehind> (“[White w]omen make 79 cents for every dollar men earn . . .[b]ut Black women earn only 64 cents on the
dollar); Fyre, supra note 1.
9
ASHA DUMONTHIER, CHANDRA CHILDERS & JESSICA MILLI, INST. FOR WOMEN’S POL’Y RSCH. & NAT’L
DOMESTIC WORKERS ALL., THE STATUS OF BLACK WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 24-29 (2020),
<https://iwpr.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/The-Status-of-Black-Women-6.26.17.pdf> (noting that Black women
experience higher rates of employment and labor market and “improved enforcement of anti-discrimination and equal
opportunity laws” is needed).
10
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
11
See generally Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139.
12
Martinique K. Jones & Susan X. Day, An Exploration of Black Women’s Gendered Racial Identity Using a
Multidimensional and Intersectional Approach, 79 SEX ROLES 1, 2 (2017) (“Studies establish that gendered racial
identity is more salient and important to Black women than are race and gender independently. When compared to
other women, Black women’s understanding of self at the crux of race and gender is nuanced because of their two

Jane Hunter – a thirty-seven-year-old African immigrant from Illinois. Hunter described instances
where white men in power made sexual references to her skin-color, calling her “dark chocolate,”
and stating, “I want to get a little piece of chocolate.”13 In 2017, two Ford plants in Chicago settled
a second lawsuit with Black women plaintiffs for sex and racial harassment.14 Many of the female
employees who eventually sued Ford, felt doubly victimized – propositioned and denounced as
sluts while also being called “black bitches” and other racial slurs.15 Or take Alexia Agnant, a
black saleswoman born in Jamaica.16 Despite a strong performance record, she was subject to
adverse employment actions by her white male supervisor, who commented on her nail polish and
appearance every trip she made to the office, asking if her braided hair was “from a dead person,”
and calling her “Sheneneh” to “insinuate[] that [she] was a ghetto black woman.”17 These
narratives demonstrate how Black women workers in fields dominated by white men may
experience intersectional discrimination and harassment because of their race and sex.
Research shows that low-wage Black women, like those working in the fast-food industry, “are
more likely to report negative sexual attention than white women . . . . [It is possible that] this
phenomenon occurs because women of color face a ‘double jeopardy’ of being both women and
ethnic minorities, groups more susceptible to harassment.”18 Take Barbara Johnson, for example,
who began working at McDonald’s in 2017 at age seventeen.19 As a young, Black fast food worker
her sexual harassment experiences began on her very first day.20 In detailing her encounters, she
recalled: “He made comments about how juicy my lips was, how cute I am, how my uniform fit
me in all the right places, how I’m thick in all the right places. He’d look at me and lick his lips. It
all made me feel uncomfortable, like I was unsafe.”21 She was groped on multiple occasions and
her manager often witnessed her continued harassment yet laughed it off.22 Although many Black
oppressed identities, both of which shape each other. Furthermore, the oppression of women of color endure because
of their race and gender perhaps enhances the salience of their intersectional identity and informs the way they
construct and assign meaning to this identity (e.g., resilience and strength).”).
13
Jessica Prois & Carolina Moreno, The #MeToo Movement Looks Different for Women of Color. Here Are 10
Stories, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 2, 2018, 9:20 AM), <https://www.huffpost.com/entry/women-of-color-metoo_n_5a442d73e4b0b0e5a7a4992c>.
14
Susan Chira & Catrin Einhorn, How Tough Is It to Change a Culture of Harassment? Ask Women at Ford,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2017), <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/19/us/ford-chicago-sexualharassment.html> (“Bosses and fellow laborers treated them as property or prey. Men crudely commented on their
breasts and buttocks; graffiti of penises was carved into tables, spray-painted onto floors and scribbled onto walls.
They groped women, pressed against them, simulated sex acts or masturbated in front of them. Supervisors traded
better assignments for sex and punished those who refused.”).
15
Id.
16
Agnant v. CSC Holdings, LLC, No. 17-cv-3349, 2020 WL 2615907, at *1 (E.D. NY May 20, 2020).
17
Id. Alexia’s supervisor also referred to her as “Sheneneh,” a reference to a comedic parody of a “ghetto” black
woman played by actor Martin Lawrence. The court allowed her Title VII race discrimination to survive summary
judgement, but not her sex discrimination claim. Id. at *9-12.
18
See Akhtar, supra note 6.
19
Tim Rowden, Tired of on-the-Job Sexual Harassment, Workers Demand Change at McDonald’s, LAB. TRIB.
(Oct. 1, 2018), <https://labortribune.com/tired-of-on-the-job-sexual-harassment-workers-demand-change-atmcdonalds>.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
As long-time employees of fast-food franchises, Black women employees rely on these low-wage positions to
help them cover rent, food, basic child-care, and other household expenses. See Kalena Thomhave, McDonald’s
Workers Strike to Demand Response to Sexual Harassment Charges, AM. PROSPECT (Sept. 20, 2018),
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women and other women of color mobilized to strike and file a class action lawsuit against
McDonald’s for this type of harassment,23 the COVID-19 pandemic has created even greater
economic precarity, which may intensify the marginalization of these workers. Since the start of
the pandemic, female workers have reported a noticeable uptick in sexualized comments from
customers and also experienced or witnessed increased sexual harassment in the food industry.24
Black women from across the country confront similar workplace realities where both their
race and gender identities contribute to their experiences of workplace discrimination and
harassment. However, these experiences do not fit narrowly into the Title VII antidiscrimination
frameworks used by courts to assess claims. Instead of recognizing that race and gender-based
discrimination often co-exist for women of color, judges too often parse out specific conduct as
based on race” or “based on sex,” instead of considering the totality of the circumstances. We need
to close the gap between the legal definitions of discrimination and the lived experience of Black
women workers unique positionality whose marginalization within the workplace are defined by
the intersectional nature of their race and sex.25
In other words, Black women workers experience discrimination in distinct ways that require
Courts to undergo a more complex and nuanced analysis that reviews the aggregate nature of
overlapping harms. However, judges and lawmakers have been extremely reluctant to do so in
both the discrimination and harassment contexts. Under the current intersectionality legal
framework, a Black women worker, like Emerald Jane-Hunter, Barbara Johnson, or Alexia
Agnant, who experiences discrimination and/or harassment because of her race and sex must
decide whether to bring multiple, separate claims under Title VII for each protected category or
an intersectional claim, and with either option, they have a high risk of failure at the summary
judgment stage. While the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has identified
intersectional discrimination as a potential claim, it has not provided any specific guidance to
courts on how to interpret Title VII to allow and evaluate this cause of action.26

<https://prospect.org/labor/mcdonald-s-workers-strike-demand-response-sexual-harassment-charges>. In a recent
2020 case, two additional McDonald’s employees, who are Black women, filed a class action lawsuit against the
company for their experiences of harassment and retaliation. See Michelle Chen, Fed Up: Women Fast-Food Workers
Fight Back, MS. MAG. (Mar. 28, 2015), <https://msmagazine.com/2015/03/28/fed-up-women-fast-food-workersfight-back>; Lisa Jennings, McDonald’s Corp. Faces New Charges of Sexual Harassment and Retaliation, NATION’S
RESTAURANT NEWS (Apr. 13, 2020), <https://www.nrn.com/quick-service/mcdonald-s-corp-faces-new-chargessexual-harassment-and-retaliation>.
23
Chen, supra note 22; Jennings, supra note 22.
24
See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON & LOUISE FITZGERALD, U.C. BERKELEY FOOD LAB. RSCH. CTR. &
BARRY COMMONER CTR. FOR HEALTH & ENV., TAKE YOUR MASK OFF SO I KNOW HOW MUCH TO TIP YOU: SERVICE
WORKERS’ EXPERIENCE OF HEALTH & HARASSMENT DURING COVID-19 (2020), <https://onefairwage.site/wpcontent/uploads/2020/12/OFW_COVID_WorkerExp-1.pdf>.
25
Dan Cassino & Yasemin Besen-Cassino, Race, Threat and Workplace Sexual Harassment: The Dynamics of
Harassment in the United States, 1997–2016, 26 GENDER, WORK & ORG. 1221, 1222 (2019) (“[S]exual harassment
is both a legal issue and a lived experience.”).
26
Yvette N.A. Pappoe, The Shortcomings of Title VII for the Black Female Plaintiff, 22 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. Change
1, 18 (2019); Bradley Allan Areheart, Intersectionality and Identity: Revisiting a Wrinkle in Title VII, 17 GEO. MASON
U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 199, 232-34 (2006).

III. OVERVIEW OF TITLE VII INTERSECTIONAL DISCRIMINATION AND HARASSMENT CLAIMS
Under the current Title VII analytical frameworks, courts struggle to analyze intersectional
claims and address the compounding effects of race and sex. As a result, Black women plaintiffs
fail to receive adequate relief. Courts primarily evaluate intersectional race and sex claims as
mutually exclusive legal categories. In doing so, white women and Black men are able to vindicate
their harms while Black women are often left with inadequate remedies.
The MeToo movement has sparked some momentum in gender equity legislation at the state
level, yet these reforms have also failed to address intersectionality. Of the many reforms proposed
and passed across the United states, not one explicitly addresses intersectionality. 27 The
overwhelming majority of state reform efforts include language to better protect those bringing
sex harassment claims, but not those also experiencing racial discrimination and harassment. Any
reform that does not acknowledge intersectionality cannot adequately address the way Black
women are commonly subordinated based on their race and sex, and Black women will remain
largely unprotected.28
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination based on an individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.29 While Black women experience disproportionately high
rates of discrimination and harassment, they face many hurdles even before they can consider
filing a Title VII lawsuit.30 For example, many positions dominated by women of color are not
protected by federal law.31 This includes domestic workers, including nannies, house cleaners, and
home care workers, where Black women are overrepresented, 32 and the increasing number of
Black women working in the gig economy. Other roadblocks to state and federal court include
rigid statute of limitations, increased mandatory arbitration, and difficulty finding an attorney to
take intersectional claims.33
For the Black women who defeat the odds to get cases filed, the Title VII statutory framework
and judicial interpretation are ill equipped to address intersectional discrimination and harassment.
Plaintiffs alleging discrimination based on multiple protected categories are more likely to lose on

27

See infra, Part VI.
See generally Crenshaw, supra note 10.
29
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
30
See generally Tanya Kateri Hernandez, A Critical Race Feminism Empirical Research Project: Sexual
Harassment & the Internal Complaints Black Box, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1235 (2006); see also Ashleigh Shelby
Rosette et al., Intersectionality: Connecting Experiences of Gender with Race at Work, 38 RSCH. ORG. BEHAV. 1, 13
(2018); Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Unwrapping Racial Harassment Law, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 49,
60 (2006).
31
Debra L. Ness, Domestic Workers Bill of Rights Would Help Provide Dignity, Respect and Workplace
Protections
to
Millions,
NAT’L
P’SHIP
FOR
WOMEN
&
FAMILIES
(July
24,
2019),
<https://www.nationalpartnership.org/our-impact/blog/general/domestic-workers-bill-of-right-provide-dignityrespect-workplace-protections-to-millions.html>.
32
Data shows that there are over 2.2 million domestic workers, with over half of these workers holding positions
as home care aids. 91.5 percent of these workers are women, with an overrepresented number of these workers being
Black women. See Julia Wolfe, Domestic Workers Are at Risk During the Coronavirus Crisis, ECON. POL’Y INST.
(Apr. 8, 2020, 10:00 AM), <https://www.epi.org/blog/domestic-workers-are-at-risk-during-the-coronavirus-crisisdata-show-most-domestic-workers-are-black-hispanic-or-asian-women>.
33
Infra Part VI.
28
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summary judgement compared to those alleging claims based on one protected category.34 Further,
plaintiffs alleging intersectional discrimination who make it beyond summary judgment are only
half as likely to win their cases, compared to other type of plaintiffs.35 Outcomes are even more
bleak for Black women bringing these claims. Rachel Kahn Best and co-authors found that women
of color who make it beyond the summary judgment stage are generally the least likely to win their
cases, even less than white men alleging discrimination.36 Thus, while Title VII was enacted to
eliminate employment discrimination based on race, color, national origin, race, or religion, in
reality it is not providing a remedy for the many Black women plaintiffs experiencing
intersectional discrimination and harassment.
Intersectional discrimination claims most commonly arise in the context of disparate treatment
and are analyzed with the McDonnell Douglas framework established by the Supreme Court.37
Following McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case by showing that:
(1) she is member of a protected class; (2) she is qualified; (3) she was subject to an adverse
employment action; and (4) other circumstances give rise to an inference of discrimination. 38 For
the fourth prong, “most courts require the plaintiff to show evidence of a similarly situated
‘comparator’ outside of their protected class” who was not treated adversely.39 Who the court
perceives to be an “appropriate” comparator becomes a tricky inquiry for Black women bringing
intersectional sex and race claims.40
Black women may also encounter “unintentional” intersectional discrimination, analyzed
using a disparate impact burden shifting framework.41 This is a more subtle form of exclusion that
occurs when a seemingly neutral policy or practice unduly disadvantages individuals based on
their protected class.42 For example, minimum height requirements are facially neutral, but may
have a disparate impact on women. A policy or practice that is neutral on its face can also
disproportionately exclude Black women in particular.43 For example, a policy prohibiting all34
Minna Kotkin, Diversity and Discrimination a Look at Complex Bias, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1439, 1459
(2009) (noting that 96 percent of intersectional employment discrimination claims lose on summary judgment as
compared to 73 percent of cases alleging discrimination based on one protected group).
35
Rachel Kahn Best et al., Multiple Disadvantages: An Empirical Test of Intersectionality Theory in EEO
Litigation, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 991, 1009 (2011) (Women of color win 15 percent of cases, compared to 31 percent
for white men, and 38 percent for white women).
36
Id.
37
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). This article breaks this analysis out into three
categories: (1) intersectional “discrimination,”(2) analyzed as disparate treatment or disparate impact, and (3)
intersectional harassment (most often hostile environment) analyzed separately, although technically it is also a form
of discrimination.
38
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 575-76 (1978); Giles v. Univ. of Toledo, 286 F. App’x 295, 303
(6th Cir. 2008); Prescott v. Higgins, 538 F.3d 32, 40-41 (1st Cir. 2008); Anderson v. Westinghouse Savannah River
Co., 406 F.3d 248, 268-69 (4th Cir. 2005); Stella v. Mineta, 284 F.3d 135, 144-45 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
39
See Stephanie Bornstein, Equal Work, 77 MD. L. REV. 581, 604 (2018) (“[F]or example a male employee for a
sex claim and a white employee for a race claim.”).
40
Carole H. Hofstein, African American Women and the Limits of Law and Society, 1 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J.
373, 375 (1994) (explaining how an employer can rebut black women’s race and gender discrimination claims by
comparing her to black men and white women).
41
See generally Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
42
See generally id.
43
Cf. Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (considering a policy prohibiting all-

braided hairstyles will disproportionately impact black women.44 In disparate impact cases, once
a plaintiff demonstrates that a policy or practice has a disproportionately harmful effect on a
protected class,45 the employer must show the policy or practice is job related for the position in
question and consistent with business necessity.46 Even with that showing, the employer will lose
if the plaintiff can show that another less discriminatory alternative requirement would suffice.47
A common employer defense to intersectional discrimination claims brought by Black women
is that the race claim fails because Black men are not discriminated against and the sex claim fails
because white women are not discriminated against. For example, in Jefferies v. Harris County
Community Action Ass’n, the district court failed to consider the combined effect of race and sex
discrimination on the plaintiff, who, as a Black female, was repeatedly passed over for
promotions.48 Despite her qualifications, the district court ruled against the plaintiff, relying on the
fact that: (1) the person who received the promotion Jefferies sought was black and (2) the
employer had presented statistical evidence that a number of white females and Black males on
the employer’s staff.49 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit remanded the case, stating that Black female
plaintiffs may still be discriminated against “in the absence of discrimination against black men or
white women.”50 Thus, adherence to this comparator-based approach can be particularly
problematic for Black women bringing intersectional claims because it prevents the more
contextual approach that may be required to address questions of intersectionality.
For intersectional discrimination claims, the EEOC takes the position that Title VII prohibits
discrimination not solely for one protected trait, but also prohibits discrimination because of the
intersection of two or more bases.51 Specifically, the EEOC notes that Title VII prohibits
discrimination against Black women even if the employer does not discriminate against white
women or Black men. Thus, the EEOC acknowledges that there is a particular way in which Black
women may experience employment discrimination due to their identity being at the intersection
of being Black and being women.
Intersectional harassment claims are most commonly analyzed under a hostile work
environment theory. To bring an intersectional harassment claim, a Black woman plaintiff must
braided hairstyle disproportionately impacted black women, but noting that plaintiff had failed to allege that allbraided hairstyles were worn predominantly by Black people); Carla D. Pratt, Sisters in Law: Black Women Lawyers’
Struggle for Advancement, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1777, 1782-85 (expectations for maintaining a traditional
professional image impose more demands on black women); Melissa Pascualini, Ban the Box: Breaking Barriers to
Employment in the Private Sector, 37 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 255, 259-60 (2019) (hiring policies that evaluate
candidates based on criminal history can disproportionately affect black women).
44
See Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232.
45
Usually by statistical comparison, which the defendant employer can challenge.
46
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32, 436.
47
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii), (1)(C).
48
Jefferies v. Harris Cnty. Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032 (5th Cir. 1980).
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
See EEOC Compliance Manual § 15(IV)(C) (Apr. 19, 2006), <https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/section15-race-and-color-discrimination#IVC> (“Title VII prohibits discrimination not just because of one protected trait
(e.g. race), but also because of the intersection of two or more protected bases (e.g. race and sex). . . . The law also
prohibits individuals from being subjected to discrimination because of the intersection of their race and a trait covered
by another EEO statute – e.g., race and disability, or race and age.”).
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prove that she was subject to a hostile workplace because of her protected category. Here, Black
women may experience harassment, subordination, and other exploitation that is both racial and
because of their sex. Common defenses to intersectional harassment claims brought by Black
women are that (1) they didn’t complain and (2) the harassment they experienced wasn’t “severe
or pervasive.” For the first defense, in cases where harassment occurs, but there is no termination,
demotion, or other tangible employment action taken by the supervisor, the employer may assert
an affirmative defense to defeat liability or damages. The affirmative defense created by the
Supreme Court in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth
comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to
prevent and correct promptly any illegal harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.52
Both elements may not always be required.53
Employers also commonly argue that the conduct falls short of meeting the standard of being
severe or pervasive enough to be actionable.54 Under this defense, courts have barred causes of
action because they don’t find them objectively intimidating or offensive.55 Many lower courts
have interpreted this standard to require conduct to be both severe and pervasive.56 This standard
is set at such a high bar that conduct is rarely found to be threatening, humiliating, or abusive
enough to support a claim, even in some cases when the facts would give rise to a criminal
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offense.57 This is particularly problematic for intersectional claims when the courts force plaintiffs
to divide incidents up into separate claims: for sex and then for race. After artificially
disaggregating, they then hold that the incidents alleged for race are not sufficiently severe or
pervasive for a race claim, and those that are alleged as related to sex, are not severe or pervasive
enough for a sex claim to proceed. This analysis ignores the overlapping nature of the harassment
and the totality of the circumstances standard established in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.58
As it pertains to intersectional harassment claims, the EEOC does not explicitly carve out a
section in its guidance memo for those claims. Instead, the EEOC, in its examples for racial
harassment, describes a Black woman named Kyra, stating that “[t]he evidence supports the
conclusion that Kyra was subjected to a hostile work environment because of her race, sex, or the
intersection of both, in light of the pattern of offensive comments and evidence that the bias altered
the terms and conditions of Kyra’s employment,” thus hinting that such a claim can be made.59
The guidance does not, however, describe how this type of intersectional claim should be
analyzed.60
IV. MUDDY WATERS: COURTS REMAIN SPLIT ON HOW TO ANALYZE INTERSECTIONAL CLAIMS
Currently, circuit courts have adopted four somewhat distinct approaches to Title VII
intersectional race and sex claims. These approaches are: (1) separate claims for each protected
trait; (2) sex-plus and/or race-plus framework; (3) Black women as a distinct, protected category;
or (4) a totality/aggregate approach. The remaining circuits are inconsistent in how they analyze
intersectional claims.
A. Narrow Interpretation of Title VII
Sometimes referred to as the DeGraffenreid approach, the Fourth and Eighth Circuits have
interpreted the language and intent of Title VII as requiring Black women workers to sue on the
separate bases of race or sex discrimination rather than pursue an intersectional discrimination
race and sex claim.61 When a Black woman plaintiff alleges that her workplace experience is the
result of her race and sex, she is required to bisect her identity and experiences in a way that does
not reflect her reality in order to bring a claim. These claims may also then be perceived as weaker
once they are bifurcated in this way.
For example, the Eighth Circuit will not recognize an intersectional claim from a Black woman
that combines two causes of action under the false assumption that doing so will create a “special”
sub-category that would receive a “super-remedy.”62 In DeGraffenreid, five Black women alleged
that the “last hired first fired” seniority system used by General Motors (GM) had a disparate
57
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impact on Black women. Prior to 1964, GM did not hire Black women, and all of the Black women
who were hired after that point were terminated during a recession due to GM’s lay-off policy.63
The court granted summary judgment to GM for the sex claim and dismissed the race claim without
prejudice, finding that a consideration of both would afford greater relief to Black women than
other potential plaintiffs.64
Under this framework, the Eighth Circuit continues to parse out which protected trait motivates
the alleged discriminatory conduct. For example, in Carter v. Chrysler Corp., a Black woman
plaintiff, Gloria S. Carter, sued her employer and union under Title VII after experiencing race
and sex harassment in her job as an assembly line worker.65 She produced evidence that her white,
male co-workers directed sexual and racial epithets towards her and repeatedly disrupted her work
performance by placing “[a] picture of a naked man, dead animals, threatening notes, foul-smelling
material, and debris” in her work area.66 Even with her strong evidence of discrimination, the court
focused on disaggregating her claims, writing: “There is no dispute that Carter is a member of
protected classes or that she was subject to unwelcome harassment, but the parties disagree about
whether the hostile acts directed at Carter were because of her race or gender.”67 By concerning
itself with making this distinction, the Eight Circuit misinterprets the spirit of Title VII and
minimizes the significance of the harassment being the result of Gloria’s race and sex.
The Eighth Circuit’s reasoning reflects a flawed understanding of intersectionality theory as
somehow harmful to white women, Black men, and other individuals perceived to have a singular
protected trait. In reality, the Eighth Circuit’s failure to recognize combined race and sex claims
under Title VII leaves Black women, as members of multiple marginalized groups, in an untenable
position. By requiring them to separate the harms they experience and choose a race or sex claim,
Black women are asked to define their experience based on outcomes of white women or Black
men.68 This approach is the narrowest interpretation of Title VII across the circuits and
unnecessarily dismisses legitimate Title VII claims brought by Black women workers.
The Fourth Circuit has also analyzed Black female plaintiffs’ racial and sexual harassment
claims separately. For example, in Mosby-Grant v. City of Hagerstown, the Court analyzed a Black
woman’s racial and sexual harassment claims separately, while declining to “address whether she
would have been able to sustain a ‘hybrid’ sex and race claim under Title VII because she had not
raised the issue.”69 In that case, the plaintiff, Tiffany Mosby-Grant, was a Black female recruit in
the Police Academy.70 Throughout her training she was the only woman and one of two Black
recruits.71 During the isolating experience, Tiffany overheard racist and sexist statements, received
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complaints from other recruits that she received special treatment because she was a woman, and
was the target of negative comments by her peers.72 Tiffany excelled through training until the
final weeks where she failed her final firearms test, which heightened the harassment.73
When presented with her appeal, the Fourth Circuit reviewed Tiffany’s intersectional claims
for distinct evidence that could support either a sex or race claim. In explaining its review, the
Court wrote:
[w]e are keenly aware of the difficulties inherent in parsing out Title VII claims brought
by individuals, e.g., African American women, who fall under more than one protected
class. We also recognize that a hostile work environment claim can be bolstered by relying
on evidence of a workplace tainted by both sex and racial discrimination . . . . Nevertheless,
there are now two distinct counts before us, and the evidence of the pervasiveness or
severity of racial animus at the Academy is too isolated and too minimal to survive
summary judgment.74
This suggests that the Court was unwilling to allow her intersectional claim to prevail, despite its
awareness of intersectional theory, and the fact that an intersectional analysis would better capture
her claim. The Fourth Circuit instead opted for the harder task of “parsing out her identities” which
obscured the legitimacy of her race-based claim. In doing so, its ultimate ruling tragically
minimizes the race-based enmity that compounded Tiffany’s harassment, illustrating the existing
gap between Tiffany’s harms and Title VII intervention.75 The court’s recognition of
intersectionality, but reluctance to adopt an intersectional approach, unduly narrows the scope of
Title VII protections.
In other cases, the Fourth Circuit has explicitly expressed its concerns regarding courts’ ability
to review race-plus claims.76 For instance, in a disparate treatment case on appeal, the court wrote,
We accept, for purposes of this appeal, the theoretical possibility of proving intentional
racial discrimination on this narrow “race-plus” basis under circumstances conclusively
shown to be free of any general racial bias in making comparable employment decisions.
But we confess grave misgivings about the ability of courts fairly and rationally to assess
the existence of such an amorphous special type of racial bias.77
Implicit in the Fourth Circuit’s characterization of intersectional discrimination as “special” is a
refusal or inability to grasp the amorphous nature of Title VII. Discrimination takes various forms
and a broad interpretation of Title VII is needed to address the reality of how it occurs in
contemporary workplaces. As discussed below, the language of Title VII permits Courts to assess
discrimination, in various forms, including through an intersectional lens.78 Despite the remedial
purpose of Title VII, the narrow approach taken by the Fourth and Eighth Circuits are incapable
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of fully addressing the full scope of harm that Black women workers face.79
Courts that take narrow approaches to Title VII race and sex discrimination claims made by
Black women fail to see that the workplace discrimination they face is not one-dimensional.
Requiring discrete claims for discrete categories should end across courts. It fails to protect Black
women who experience discrimination and harassment and allows employers to evade Title VII
liability based on an artificial construction of identity. In recognizing intersectional identities,
courts will be able to address sex and race claims together as part of one singular claim rather than
dissecting the discrimination and harassment to fit the traditional analytical frameworks.
B. Sex-Plus Framework
Increasingly, courts have broadened the interpretation of Title VII in a way that better accounts
for Black women workers’ intersectional identity and experiences in the workplace. One approach
is to adopt a “sex-plus,” and less commonly, a “race-plus” framework to analyze intersectional
claims.80 For example, the Second, Third, and Tenth Circuits use different terms to describe the
same sex-plus intersectional framework, interpreting Title VII to provide a remedy for
discrimination because of multiple protected traits and related characteristics.81 The sex-plus
framework was developed due to the inability of the traditional sex discrimination framework to
fully encompass the various ways in which an employee may be discriminated against. This
framework expands the notion of protected category by allowing plaintiffs to bring forth claims in
which they allege discrimination based on multiple characteristics.82 Sex-plus discrimination is
generally understood as a form of subgroup discrimination in which an employer targets only a
certain segment of male or female employees due to the employee’s sex and another characteristic,
the “plus” characteristic.83 Thus, in a sex-plus discrimination claim, an employee alleges that they
were discriminated against in part because of their sex, in addition to another characteristic they
have, such as having young children or being married.84
The Supreme Court first established the sex-plus framework in its 1971 decision of Phillips v.
Martin Marietta Corp.85 Originally, the sex-plus framework was used to carve out protections for
employees who suffer discrimination based on sex, plus a neutral trait that is not protected under
the statute.86 In Phillips, the female plaintiff, Ida Phillips, brought forth a Title VII sex
discrimination action after being told by defendant, Martin Marietta Corporation, that it was not
accepting applications from women with preschool aged children.87 At the time, Martin Marietta
had employed men with preschool aged children and had also employed women without them.
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Thus, the issue here was not that Phillips was being discriminated against solely because of her
identity as a woman. Phillips was being discriminated against because of her sex plus the additional
trait of her having preschool aged children. The Supreme Court recognized this when it held that
a violation of Title VII occurs when an employer has a different hiring policy for men with children
than it does for women with children.88 Since the Phillips decision, Circuit Courts have further
developed the sex-plus employment discrimination framework, which can be applied to recognize
intersectional claims brought by Black women.
For example, the Second Circuit adopted the sex-plus analytical framework to evaluate
intersectional claims under Title VII.89 In Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp, the court allowed a
claim where a plaintiff alleged she was being treated differently based on her status as an older
woman. The court recognized that it was possible for an older woman employee to experience
discrimination in such a way that not all members of her gender experience it, and in such a way
that is different from what older male employees experience.90 In recognizing this, the Second
Circuit held sex-plus-age claims actionable.91 Given the Second Circuit’s receptiveness to
intersectional claims that implicate other federal statutes, sex-plus race claims may fare well in
this jurisdiction since these claims fall squarely within Title VII and do not implicate another
federal law.
The Third Circuit also adopted the sex-plus framework when evaluating claims under Title
VII. In Goosby v. Johnson & Johnson Medical, Inc., a Black woman plaintiff brought forth a race
and gender discrimination claim.92 There, the defendant attempted to argue that plaintiff’s gender
discrimination should be dismissed because the only other woman in plaintiff’s division was
reassigned to a more desirable position.93 However, the Third Circuit rejected the defendant’s
claim by noting that “evidence that [the employer] afforded a White female an assignment that it
denied to a Black female hardly defeats a claim of race/gender discrimination brought by a Black
female.”94 By noting this, the Third Circuit recognized that Black women experience sex
discrimination in ways that white women do not. This acknowledgement effectively demonstrates
that the Third Circuit recognizes intersectional claims.
Sex-plus doctrine continues to evolve as new Supreme Court decisions are handed down. In
the recent Tenth Circuit case Frappied v. Affinity Gaming Black Hawk, LLC., the court relied on
the Supreme Court’s analysis in Bostock v. Clayton County to allow plaintiffs to proceed with a
sex-plus-age disparate impact claim.95 In Bostock, the United States Supreme Court held that,
when an employer makes an adverse employment decision in part because of the employee’s
88
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identity as homosexual or transgender, the employer violates Title VII’s prohibition on sex
discrimination because the identities are interwoven.96 The plaintiffs in Frappied were casino
workers who were laid off and alleged they were unlawfully discriminated against because they
were women over forty years old. In the Frappied opinion, the court explicitly found that sex-plusrace claims to be valid and intersectional sex-plus-age discrimination to be prohibited by Title
VII.97 Thus, the Tenth Circuit clarified that intersectional claims are also cognizable even if the
plus trait, such as age or disability, falls within a separate statute.98 In this case, if the employer
fires all older people, it is not because of sex, but if they are specifically terminating female older
workers, but not male older workers, this is sex-plus discrimination prohibited by Title VII.99
In the Frappied opinion, the Tenth Circuit stressed the importance of recognizing intersectional
claims. It reasoned that acknowledging these claims best reflects the congressional intent of Title
VII, prohibiting discrimination based on stereotypes.100 Furthermore, it noted that when
intersectional claims are not explicitly recognized, they are picked apart in such a way that paints
an incomplete picture.101 The Tenth Circuit argued that when courts look at claims individually
rather than recognizing how certain protected characteristics interact, they perpetuate a system
which only views discrimination as a one-dimensional experience.102 Thus, those individuals with
multiple protected Title VII characteristics, such as Black women, have their experiences reduced
to traditional sex discrimination or race discrimination frameworks that are a misfit. Following the
Frappied decision, it is possible that other circuits may also begin to see the importance of
understanding intersectionality in the employment context. Further, plaintiffs and plaintiffs’
attorneys may be more inclined to bring more nuanced claims as additional circuits begin to adopt
sex-plus-race Title VII frameworks.103
The sex-plus framework is a step in the right direction by providing plaintiffs, attorneys, and
courts an avenue to recognize intersectional claims involving two or more Title VII-protected
categories.104 Specifically, for Black women employees, the sex-plus framework should serve as
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a non-controversial mechanism for bringing forth the intersectional sex-plus-race discrimination
claim, given these identities are both protected under Title VII. The sex-plus framework further
forces courts to face the reality that some sex discrimination claims are more complex than others.
Again, in the case of the Black woman employee, many times, the discrimination faced by Black
women differs from that faced by Black men and white women.105
While recognizing intersectional claims under the sex-plus framework is an improvement over
analyzing the claims separately, there are drawbacks to this approach. First, sex discrimination is
still the heart of the claim which de-centers racial identity and experiences.106 Therefore, this
doctrine still requires Black women to bisect their identity and choose sex as the primary trait if
they want to pursue a claim in a sex-plus jurisdiction. This framing makes Black women hold their
race out as secondary, which minimizes that part of their identity and the racial component of the
discrimination experienced, which also encourages the courts to treat it as such.107 A true
intersectional approach would not relegate a characteristic, such as race, as subordinate and less
central than the sex characteristic. Instead, a true intersectional claim would recognize that both
characteristics are central to the analysis, making the claim more than just a variant of sex
discrimination.108
Second, some circuits that recognize sex-plus as a legitimate framework have not similarly
acknowledged race-plus as a viable claim.109 At a minimum, courts should be recognizing both
sex-plus claims and race-plus claims. For example, a Black woman plaintiff could bring a raceplus-sex discrimination claim where she compares her employer’s actions towards her to the
employer’s actions toward her white female coworkers. This framework is needed so that Black
women plaintiffs have an opportunity to bring intersectional race discrimination claims and not
just intersectional sex discrimination claims. Ideally, courts should move beyond the “plus”
framing, to combine the race and sex claims in such a way that places both at the heart of the claim.
Lastly, both sex-plus and race-plus discrimination claims overemphasize comparator
analysis.110 In Coleman, the Tenth Circuit held that “gender-plus plaintiffs can never be successful
if there is no corresponding subclass of members of the opposite gender” because, without a
comparator, those plaintiffs will be unable to show they were treated differently from those who
105
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are similarly situated.111 Thus, a Black woman bringing a sex plus race discrimination claims, must
center the argument on comparing her treatment to the treatment of Black male employees.112 For
race-plus-sex claims, courts require a comparison of Black women employees to their white
women counterparts. Some scholars have noted that this focus on comparator analysis is both
overinclusive and underinclusive.113 Overinclusive in that it does not prove as much as it is
believed to prove and underinclusive in that a comparator’s absence does not mean that
discrimination has not occurred.114 Following Coleman, lower courts applying sex-plus framework
to Title VII claims tend to treat comparator analysis as a threshold requirement for proving that
discrimination actually occurred.115 These courts that have followed the Tenth Circuit’s decision
in Coleman should recognize that comparator analysis is no longer required by the Tenth Circuit
following Frappied.
C. Black Women as a Protected Class
The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have considered race and sex claims together and held that
Black women are a protected class.116 The Fifth Circuit was the first circuit to recognize protection
specific to Black women. In the seminal case, Jefferies v. Harris County (discussed above), the
Court found that Black women were protected under Title VII as a sub-group given “their race and
sex because to deny their unique experiences would leave them without a viable Title VII
remedy.”117 Using this framework, in Williams v. City of Tupelo, Mississippi, the Fifth Circuit
analyzed a Title VII claim from a Black female police officer cadet who alleged discrimination on
the basis of her race and sex.118 The plaintiff alleged that she had applied to become a police officer
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and was dismissed and subsequently replaced by a white male because she was a Black woman.119
The district court initially granted summary judgment for the City, finding that they had hired a
number of Black men and that the plaintiff had not sufficiently passed firearms training. 120 The
Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the
plaintiff had sufficiently passed training, and ample evidence to suggest that the “real reason” her
supervisors recommended her dismissal was that they did not want a Black woman working with
them.121 Relying on Jefferies, the Court noted that it was irrelevant that the city had hired Black
men and white women, since it had failed to hire a Black woman since 2004.122
The Eleventh Circuit has also recognized Black women as a distinct protected subgroup under
Title VII.123 In Mosley v. Alabama Unified Judicial System, a Black juvenile probation officer
brought an action under Title VII alleging that she was discriminated against based on her sex and
race. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment decision to
limit Mosley’s Title VII discrimination claims to those of only gender discrimination. The
Eleventh Circuit reasoned that Mosley had identified the Title VII discrimination claim in her
summary judgment brief as a “sex discrimination claim,” and, while she satisfied her prima facie
case because she was an “African American female,” she had not provided any other reference to
the distinct protected subclass of Black woman or citations to case law regarding “intersectional
discrimination.”124 Following the Mosley precedent, a Black woman plaintiff would need to plead
race and sex discrimination based on her protected class as a Black woman, citing to related case
law analyzing intersectional discrimination.
While these circuits have at least acknowledged the identities of Black women and their
experiences in the workplace, this approach may face similar limitations as other courts who
employ the traditional sex-plus framework. While Jefferies acknowledged that Black women are
entitled to a viable remedy under Title VII as a protected sub-group, the court still used “sex” as
the main method of analysis, inferring that the plaintiff’s race as a Black woman was a secondary
characteristic that should be analyzed only “in addition” to her sex claim, thereby subordinating
her racial identity.125
D. Totality or Aggregate Framework
The Sixth and Ninth Circuits have not explicitly categorized Black women as a protected class,
but they do consider Title VII intersectional race and sex claims together under an “aggregate” or
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“totality” framework.126 In Lam v. University of Hawaii, the Ninth Circuit evaluated a
discrimination claim from a Vietnamese woman who applied for and was denied a university
professor position. She filed suit alleging the University discriminated against her during the hiring
process based on her race, sex, and national origin. The district court granted summary judgment
to the University, in part, because the University favorably considered an Asian man and white
woman as candidates for the position. The Ninth Circuit, citing Kimberlé Crenshaw, criticized the
district court’s treatment of Lam’s claims as mathematical and determined that two or three bases
of discrimination “cannot be neatly reduced to distinct components.”127 Instead, the court held that
it is necessary for courts to consider a plaintiff’s claim of discrimination based on a combination
of two or more protected categories rather than focus solely on whether an employer discriminates
based on one category or another.128 The Sixth Circuit adopted the Lam court’s rationale in Shazor
v. Professional Transit Management, specifying that Title VII is meant to protect plaintiffs who
“fall between two stools” when claims involve multiple protected characteristics.129 The Court
reasoned that the “realities of the workplace” prohibit an “artificial approach” to Title VII claims
where protected characteristics are treated separately.130
Both the Tenth and Third Circuits have shown signs of analyzing beyond just sex-plus and
adopting the broader “totality” approach to analyze intersectional claims like the Sixth and Ninth
circuits. The Tenth Circuit went in this direction in Hicks v. Gates Rubber Company, where a
Black female security guard brought a Title VII action against her former employer for harassment
based on race and sex.131 After a bench trial, the district court rejected Hicks’ claims of a racially
hostile work environment, along with a separate sex based hostile work environment claim. 132 On
appeal, while the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s findings for Hicks’ race hostile work
environment claim, the Court remanded Hicks’ sex harassment claim. Hicks introduced evidence
that her supervisor made serious racial slurs, and the Court found that those incidents of racial
harassment were insufficient to support a racially hostile work environment claim but could be
combined with incidents of sexual harassment to prove a pervasive pattern of discriminatory
harassment in violation of Title VII. Similarly, in Goosby, the Third Circuit alluded to the totality
approach for disparate treatment claims by framing the plaintiffs claim as “race/gender
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discrimination.”133 Unlike sex plus, in Goosby, the Third Circuit was not placing one trait as
superior to the other; instead, it recognized that both traits played an equal role in the adverse
employment action.
While the “aggregate” or “totality” framework appears to better analyze intersectional claims,
like those circuits identifying Black woman as a protected category, or those using sex-plus, courts
using the totality approach have continued to place an analytical emphasis on “sex.” In Hicks,
despite the fact that the defendant conceded that “racial slurs and jokes were tolerated” in the
workplace, the Tenth Circuit concluded that a few “casual comments” were insufficient for a
racially hostile work environment, even though the plaintiff was the only Black woman in her
security force and there were only two Black guards.134 Yet, while analyzing her sex claim, the
Court had no issue with “aggregat[ing] evidence of racial hostility with [her] evidence of sexual
hostility.”135
This approach may also present disadvantages when bringing disparate impact claims,
depending on how the court analyzes the claim. In Moore v. Hughes Helicopter, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the rejection of a plaintiff’s class action certification seeking to represent Black women,
Black men, and white women in a disparate impact action.136 The district court had certified a class
of Black female employees but would not allow the plaintiff to represent White women because
the plaintiff claimed that she was discriminated against as a Black woman, not as a woman in
general.137 As a result, the plaintiff was only able to use statistical evidence showing “aggregate”
disparate impacts against Black women specifically, even though there was other evidence
suggesting that the employer’s practices also had a disparate impact on all Black employees and
all women.138 The Ninth Circuit ultimately affirmed the district court’s determination that the
plaintiff could not create a prima facie case of disparate impact.139
E. Additional Approaches
The Supreme Court, First Circuit, and D.C. Circuit have not specifically addressed how
intersectional claims fit under Title VII or take inconsistent approaches to this issue. The First
Circuit inconsistently handles the Title VII cases, using sex-plus theory in some cases but not
others.140 In Hicks v. Johnson, a Black female plaintiff alleged race and gender discrimination for
failure to promote, where a white male was promoted instead.141 The Plaintiff had twenty years of
government service, a majority of which was in the department in which she sought a promotion.142
When the manager retired, she and a white man with less than two years of experience in the office
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were listed as the top two candidates for promotion based on eligibility for the position. 143 Both
were interviewed by a panel following the same questions and a numerical rubric, which rendered
a “split decision,” but the white male with less experience was promoted.144 She filed claims that
the failure to promote was based on her race and gender and the district court granted defendants
summary judgment.145 The First Circuit noted that the plaintiff filed claims for race and sex as a
Black woman, but offered statistics that focused on the underrepresentation of Blacks in
management, not Black women.146 The court also noted that the department generally promoted
white women, so the claim of race and gender discrimination must fail.147
The D.C. Circuit has not officially adopted any analytical framework to evaluate intersectional
claims under Title VII. Judge v. Marsh is a notable D.C. District Court case that applied sex-plus,
but reluctantly and criticized the approach as being overly broad and turning employment
discrimination into a “many-headed hydra” that would allow claims based on too many
combinations of protected categories.148 In a more recent D.C. District Court case, Allen v.
Mnuchin, a Black woman filed a complaint against her employer for race and sex discrimination
dating back to 2008.149 In the complaint, she alleged several violent incidents of racism with a
white male co-worker.150 In response to her complaint, her employer, the U.S. Department of
Treasury, filed a motion to dismiss her various claims, specifically noting that her race and sex
claims were duplicative.151 Ms. Allen’s disparate treatment claim survived the motion to dismiss
and is still pending.152 However, the district court’s analysis demonstrates a harmful flaw in the
court’s approach to intersectional claims.153 The court cautioned Ms. Allen to “more crisply
differentiate her claim for race-based discrimination from her claim for sex/gender-based
discrimination to clarify how each of her factual allegations connects to each of [her] distinct
theories of hostile work environment discrimination.”154 As a result, the district court created
unnecessary tension and barriers to Ms. Allen’s claim, which was intersectional by nature and
predicated on her full identity as a Black woman employee.155
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Table 1. Approaches to Analyzing the Intersectional Claims of Black Women: A Survey
of the United States Courts of Appeals

Approach to Intersectional Claims

Court of Appeals

Protected Traits Analyzed Separately

Fourth, Eighth

Recognizes Intersectional Claims

Second, Third, Tenth

Sex-Plus Race and/or Race-Plus Sex
Recognizes Intersectional Claims

Fifth, Eleventh

Black Woman = Protected Category
Recognizes Intersectional Claims

Sixth, Ninth

“Aggregate” or “Totality” Framework
Inconsistent/Undecided

First, D.C.

V. EMERGING STRATEGIES FOR ADDRESSING BLACK WOMEN’S INTERSECTIONAL CLAIMS
New developments in the courts and in employment policy over the past several years may
further influence how discrimination and harassment claims brought by Black women are
analyzed. This includes: (1) Justice Gorsuch’s opinion in the Supreme Court case Bostock v.
Clayton County; (2) “discriminatory harassment” framing in recent state antidiscrimination
reform; and (3) the prospect of a reasonable black women standard for assessing claims.
A. What Bostock v. Clayton County Means for Black Women
The United States Supreme Court has not decided an intersectional sex and race Title VII
claim. However, the 2019 case Bostock v. Clayton County may have implications for Black women
plaintiffs.156 In Bostock, the Supreme Court found that an employer violates Title VII’s prohibition
on sex-based employment discrimination when firing an employee for being homosexual or being
transgender.157 Conservative Justice Neil Gorsuch, appointed by former President Trump wrote
the majority opinion and was joined in full by fellow conservative Chief Justice Roberts. Gorsuch
made three main arguments which could impact the intersectional claims brought by Black
women. First, Gorsuch argued that it is impossible to discriminate against an employee for being
156
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homosexual or transgender without discriminating against that employee based on sex.158 Second,
he reiterated that discriminatory employment decisions are “because of sex” even if an employer
only relies “in part on an individual employee’s sex.”159 Finally, he reaffirmed that an employer
may discriminate against individual employees while not discriminating against everyone in their
group.160
The language used in the Bostock opinion can reasonably be understood to support
intersectional claims under Title VII. When Gorsuch argues that it is impossible to discriminate
against a person for being homosexual or transgender without a consideration of sex, he notes that
gay and transgender identities are inextricably linked to one’s sex. Based on this interpretation, it
impossible for an employer to argue that discriminating against an employee because they are
homosexual or transgender is not also sex-based discrimination.161 Gorsuch recognizes that some
characteristics are so intertwined with a plaintiff’s Title VII protected traits that they cannot be
thought of as separate. It may follow then, for Black women alleging sex and race discrimination,
that it is impossible to discriminate against her without being discriminatory of both her race and
her sex, which are inextricably linked.162 Discrimination based on sex and race also do not occur
in “separate spheres” for Black women.163 For Black women, one cannot adequately analyze and
remedy one form of subordination – e.g. sex – in the absence of examining how interrelated
systems of domination – e.g. race – also shape the outcome.164 Accordingly, discrimination based
on one’s identity as a Black woman necessarily entails discrimination based both on her sex and
her race.165
Additionally, Gorsuch recognizes that sex need not be the only factor involved for a plaintiff
to make out a successful Title VII sex discrimination claim. He clarified the statute by holding that
“an employer violates Title VII when it intentionally fires an individual based in part on sex.”166
Furthermore, Gorsuch noted that “it makes no difference if other factors besides the plaintiff’s sex
contributed to that decision . . . .”167 This clarifies that if plaintiffs can prove that multiple protected
traits combine as “but-for” causes of the adverse action, they should prevail.168 This language
impacts Black women with intersectional race and sex claims because these plaintiffs will no
longer have to make a choice and argue that the discriminatory action occurred solely because of
race or sex. At a minimum, we now know that when multiple traits play a part in Black women’s
158
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sex discrimination claims, this does not diminish the fact that there was a Title VII violation.
Lastly, in Bostock, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that “a rule that appears evenhanded at the
group level can prove discriminatory at the level of individuals.”169 The Court reasoned that an
employer’s motivation to achieve class wide equality between the sexes does not justify individual
discrimination on the basis of sex.170 Clayton County violated Title VII because, “it could not ‘pass
the simple test’ asking whether an individual female employee would have been treated the same
regardless of her sex.”171 Although this reading of Title VII does not address intersectionality
directly, it suggests that a rule that does not exclude women, Black employees, or even Black
women as a whole, can still be found to discriminate against an individual Black woman.
The way in which circuit courts interpret Bostock will surely influence Title VII claims brought
by Black women. As discussed in Part IV, in Frappied the Tenth Circuit interpreted Bostock to
hold that sex discrimination occurs when an employer treats employees with the same “plus”
characteristic differently.172 The Frappied decision effectively demonstrates “how much of a Boon
Bostock was for intersectional conceptions of discrimination.”173 In the case of Black women
plaintiffs alleging combined sex and race discrimination, the Tenth Circuit followed Bostock to
find that sex discrimination occurred if an employer treated Black men differently than they treat
Black women. At a minimum, other circuit courts may follow this approach, allowing Black
women to bring similar sex-plus-race claims. However, this approach remains limited, as it does
not fully capture the various ways Black women may experience discrimination, with their sex not
being dominant over race; race-plus (discrimination compared to white women); or intersectional
harassment.
B. State Law “Discriminatory Harassment” Framing
While Title VII is intended to protect employees from discrimination, including harassment,
the statute does not define what constitutes workplace harassment.174 Thus, harassment law has
been left to the interpretation of the courts, and the tests, standards, and evidence requirements
169
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vary widely. Given continued federal inaction, state legislators are leading the way in
antidiscrimination and harassment reform efforts.175 For example, in 2019, New York passed a
law that replaced “sexual harassment” with a broader “discriminatory harassment” framework for
the New York equivalent of Title VII.176 The hope is that the discriminatory harassment framing
will better protect individuals with intersectional claims based on multiple protected classes, not
just those experiencing discrimination and/or harassment based on sex. Unlike New York, most
state-led harassment reforms, both proposed and passed in recent years, only offer stronger
protection for sex harassment claims, but not for race, religious, and other types of prohibited
harassment.177
While these reforms are a step in the right direction, they are not sufficient to enact real change
in the lives of the many Black women and other women of color who often experience
discrimination and harassment based on their sex and race, or other core identities. For example,
in many of the states have considered laws that address mandatory arbitration and nondisclosure
agreements.178 However, the legislation only places limits on mandatory arbitration and nondisclosure agreements for claims of sexual harassment or assault. As a result, those experiencing
intersectional harassment or discrimination based on other protected characteristics, including
race, ethnicity, or national origin, will continue to be vulnerable to these types of agreements.
Although state and federal legislatures should continue to pursue reforms, new laws will do
little to stop harassment against Black women without broad recognition of entrenched racial and
economic disparities in the legal system and society more broadly. Judges hearing these cases must
better understand how those structural disparities serve to legitimate existing maldistributions of
wealth and power, and shape workplace experiences for Black women. As such, it is of the utmost
importance to not only elect Black women to the legislature, but also to elect and appoint them as
state and federal judges, who may be more likely to prioritize these unique structural issues faced
by Black women and other women of color.
Some lawmakers may push back against the discriminatory harassment approach, fearing that
eliminating the use of the words “sexual harassment” from proposed state laws may diverge from
what constituents want: reform that specifically tackles harassment and misconduct that is sex or
gender specific, even if using a broader definition of harassment would protect more women.179
This fear reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of harassment claims that infects the analysis
of circuit courts, i.e. focusing solely on claims related to sex versus other protected traits when the
female plaintiff also has a marginalized racial identity.180 As noted above, a doctrinal framework
based on a “because of sex” analysis fails to address the reality of multidimensional discrimination
and harassment, such as racialized sex harassment. In addition to focusing solely on sex
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harassment law, the discriminatory harassment framework makes room for intersectional theory
to help address gaps in protection in a range of other contexts, such as racialized religious
harassment, racialized disability harassment, and gender-based age harassment.
Ultimately, even reform efforts targeting a broader range of workplace harassment will only
partially resolve the obstacles facing Title VII plaintiffs. As discussed in Part III, courts have a
separate and distinct analysis for Title VII disparate treatment,181 disparate impact,182 hostile work
environment,183 and retaliation claims.184 Black women often face discrimination across these
causes of action, not just siloed harassment. Parceling an individual plaintiff’s experience into
these discrete incidents, subject to separate tests with varying burdens of proof, ultimately
undermines the law’s intent and the text of Title VII itself. The text of the statute explicitly states
that its fundamental purpose is to make it unlawful for an employer to “discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” on
the basis of protected traits.185 A more unified approach, tackling the discrimination, harassment,
and retaliation an individual experiences together, may remove some of the arbitrary barriers put
in place by courts and more realistically approach workplace claims, where one’s identity and
experiences are not so easily separated.
C. Reasonable Black Woman Standard
Courts are increasingly deciding issues like the fact-intensive severe or pervasive standard for
hostile environment claims at the summary judgment stage.186 The court must review the facts and
hold whether the challenged discriminatory conduct is both subjectively and objectively severe or
pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment. If the judge assesses that it is not, the claim
will be defeated at summary judgment before having an opportunity to proceed to a jury of peers.
181
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Many courts have set a very high bar when considering whether the claim meets this standard.187
A judge assessing the claim of a Black women plaintiff has the task of determining what an
objectively “reasonable” person would find hostile, intimidating, threatening, and otherwise
harmful. However, this is from the judge’s perspective of what is reasonable for a person, while
not necessarily considering the perspective of a reasonable Black woman in that position.188 This
analysis is particularly concerning for Black women because it does not take into account the
complexities of intersectional identities, where gender and racial subordination are compounded
to create particular vulnerabilities to harassment, that is unlikely to be understood by the judge.
Critical race and feminist scholars have long challenged the reasonable person standard as
“masquerade for the reasonableness of what the people in authority (white, male, and wealthy)
believe to be reasonable.”189 While the reasonable person standard is said to be objective, judges,
primarily white men, apply their own personal experiences, which can be plagued by biases and
stereotypes, into assessment of plaintiffs’ experiences.190 They may not only have difficulty
understanding how it feels to be in the position of facing multiple forms of discrimination and
harassment, but also may have biases that operate to favor the perpetrators. What they consider
petty slights or trivial inconveniences from their privileged position can be life shifting for a Black
woman in those shoes, considering her broader experiences of subordination and the structural
realities that may make her uniquely vulnerable.191
To address these gaps, scholar Angela Onwuachi-Willig proposed that the reasonable person
standard used in the hostile environment context should take into account the plaintiff’s unique
intersectional identity.192 For Black women, this could mean applying a reasonable Black woman
standard, which may help a judge consider intersectionality theory rather than rely on his
orientation towards reasonableness when considering the severity of a Black women worker’s
harassment.193 In 1993, the EEOC proposed guidelines that asked Courts to consider “the
187
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Proponents of the reasonable woman standard hope that a gender-specific standard will help the
courts enforce Congress’s [Title VII] goal [to eliminate sex discrimination and gender disparities in
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perspective of individuals of the claimant’s race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age or
disability.”194 Although these guidelines were later withdrawn, the EEOC policy encouraged
courts to consider the perspective of the victim when applying the reasonable person standard 195
and laid the foundation for some circuit courts to adopt a reasonable woman standard.196 The
preference for a more individualized standard of reasonableness also leaves space for normative
guidance and acknowledges the simple truth: “that the law is not self-applying, but always
dependent on context.”197 The existing severe or pervasive standard reflects the fact that the
baseline workplace is inherently one created and governed by white men, thus establishing the
normative office environment from a white male-centric perspective, to the disadvantage of female
complainants, including Black women. Modifying the severe or pervasive standard to judge the
challenged conduct from the perspective of a reasonable Black woman would help to combat the
white, male-dominated context in which Black woman plaintiffs experience harassment in the
workplace and the white-male dominated judiciary in which they must assert their Title VII claims.
Ultimately, modifying the “objective” reasonable person standard to a particularized,
reasonable Black woman standard in Title VII claims can better reduce racial and gender
harassment in the workplace by attempting to acknowledge the unique context in which Black
women workers face harassment. Although this article cannot fully address the various arguments
and counter-arguments for a modified reasonable person standard, research documenting the
intersections of race and sex dynamics in the workplace, which disproportionately impact Black
woman workers, along with recent legal scholarship198 create the foundation for courts to consider
applying a reasonable Black woman standard.
VI. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
While there has been a wave of proposed reforms addressing sexual harassment claims in the
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Black women.199 While advocates for workplace reform have been acknowledging the importance
of intersectionality, the proposed bills at the state level don’t recognize it, as most only address
gender equity and not related racial equity. For example, no state has passed a workplace sexual
harassment bill using the words “intersectional” or “intersectionality.”200 And very few of the
proposed policy reforms address race.201 This omission by state legislators is likely strategic, as
activists are aware of the structural and political realities that shape which bills are passed and
which are not.202 As a social movement, MeToo, like other feminist and antiracist movements, has
marginalized the abuses faced by women of color.203 Women of color’s experiences are dissimilar
from those of the high status white women who have become the face of the #MeToo movement,
so its resulting reforms do not inherently take their needs into account.204 Instead, many of the
reforms which have actually passed were those championed by white women and garnering
significant media attention, attracting them to lawmakers.205
For example, very few of the bills protect domestic and home care workers, change rigid
statutes of limitations, reduce hurdles for bringing intersectional claims, or address damage caps
that make it difficult to find an attorney and less worthwhile to file a claim.206 And only a handful
of states introduced legislation seeking to lower the stringent “severe or pervasive” standard for
harassment claims at the state level.207 These shortcomings must be addressed in order to have
real, substantive reform to antidiscrimination laws and proper treatment of intersectional claims.
California has led the way in enacting reform that will have a more meaningful impact for
Black women. The state has altered the standard so that a single incident of sexual harassment is
199
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sufficient to create a hostile work environment.208 Additionally, California has adopted a “totality
of the circumstances” standard in lieu of “severe or pervasive,” and has determined that harassment
is sufficient if it has “unreasonably interfered” with the employee’s work performance and made
it more difficult for the employee to do their job.209 As part of its reform, California enacted a
provision that specifies “harassment cases are rarely appropriate for disposition on summary
judgment.”210 New York law has also provided that an employee need not compare their treatment
to that of another employee in order to state a claim.211 Employers can assert a defense to such a
claim if they can show that the harassing conduct did not rise above what a reasonable person in
the same protected class would consider petty slights or trivial inconveniences.212
State law advocates in Virginia, like New York, have also attempted to remedy these inequities
by introducing harassment bills more generally tailored to address problems facing Black women
and other individuals with intersectional claims.213 The “Safe and Thriving Workplace Act”
provides a statutory definition of workplace harassment in Virginia employment discrimination
law. The bill clarifies that workplace harassment shall be viewed in the “aggregate” “with varying
types” and “based on multiple characteristics” viewed in totality, rather than in isolation.214 The
bill also extends Virginia’s anti-discrimination law to employers with five or more employees215
and allows for awards of “attorney fees and costs” to include reasonable litigation expenses.216
It is too early to tell, given the highly divided Congress, but there is also greater possibility for
federal reform with the Biden-Harris administration. For example, in September 2020, the House
of Representatives passed the Creating a Respectful and Open World for Natural Hair (CROWN)
Act, which would prohibit discrimination based on a person’s hair texture or hairstyle if that style
or texture is commonly associated with a particular race or national origin.217 The CROWN Act
would legally prohibit corporate grooming policies that unfairly penalize Black women in the
workplace when wearing their hair naturally or in styles like braids and knots. 218 With a narrow
Democratic majority, the CROWN Act may see movement in the 117th Congress. The “Justice
for All Act,” introduced in October 2020, is an expansive bill to amend Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.219 This type of bill could also change the statutory language to explicitly read that
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12923(b) (West 2018); This is critical because many state and federal courts have been
requiring that harassment be severe and pervasive, so that no matter how severe, it would not be considered to create
a hostile environment if it occurred only once.
209
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more than one trait could be used in an employment discrimination or harassment claim.220
Given confusion and inconsistency across courts, at a minimum, the EEOC must issue more
specific guidance on how courts should interpret federal law to analyze intersectional claims.221
While the current EEOC guidance clarifies that intersectional discrimination is a viable cause of
action, it does not provide examples of what this may look like or what analytical framework may
be best suited for the unique types of harassment intersectional plaintiffs face. Additional guidance
is necessary to ensure plaintiffs, employers, attorneys, and judges all understand the concept of
intersectionality and to provide more clarity around how these claims should be analyzed.
VII. CONCLUSION
Intersectional discrimination and harassment are not one size fits all, and rigid analytical
frameworks that rely on discrete characteristics and narrow tests do not work. Moving forward,
advocates focused on improving employment law and policy to better protect Black women must
encourage a more holistic, yet nuanced way to analyze the multitude of ways Black women
experience intersectionality. New approaches should better comport with intersectionality theory
by not constraining plaintiffs to place one trait, typically sex, above another, race. Instead, legal
frameworks must recognize how both protected traits, race and sex, can combine in a myriad of
ways to create a unique experience for Black women in the workplace. A more flexible approach
is needed that will force lawyers, law students, and judges to see the whole person rather than
picking apart a person’s identity in such a way that minimizes experiences of discrimination.
Like many changes, reform to better protect Black women will be an uphill battle, with
intersectional approaches facing hostility in the courts using labels such as “super remedy” “many
headed hydra” “kitchen sink” This resistance improperly characterizes Black women as being
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confused about what they are experiencing, divisive, or asking for a special handout.222 However,
critique of the MeToo movement as being about white women brought greater unity and
understanding of critical issues of intersectionality, and the movement for racial justice has also
opened the world’s eyes to why we must also “say her name” and acknowledge the often
misunderstood and forgotten injustices faced by Black women.
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